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Abstract1 
The focus of this contribution is on the mode of 
capitalism within the industrialized sectors of 
“emerging markets”. Particularly in the 
context of the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) this question has gained 
considerable importance, also for the 
development of the world economy as a whole. 
The core question is whether the type of 
capitalism within these economies is similar to 
the capitalist variety of the triad, or diverges 
in more or less permanent ways. The article 
gives a preliminary answer to this question, by 
developing a rough sketch of a “BRIC” model 
of capitalism and illustrating this model with 
the case of Brazil. In terms of theory, the 
article extends the Comparative Capitalism 
(CC) perspective to  the BRICs. On the one 
side, the focus is on the classical questions of 
CC, i.e. the determinants of economic 
development and the differences to other types 
of capitalism, on the other side the 
relationship between these varieties and social 
inequality. It argues that the “state-permeated 
market economies” of the BRICs rely on clans 
as a mode of social coordination. As 
demonstrated by the case of Brazil, this type of 
capitalism can be quite successful, but is based 
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Introduction 
During the last decade, studies of Comparative 
Capitalism have mainly been preoccupied with 
countries of the triad (i.e. Japan, Western 
Europe and the US). In particular the 
“Varieties of Capitalism”- approach as 
developed by Hall and Soskice (2001a) was 
strongly focused on the US and Germany. 
Only very recently, the approach has been 
utilized in order to analyse economies outside 
of the triad, as demonstrated by the modelling 
of dependent market economies in East 
Central Europe (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009) 
and of hierarchical market economies in 
(Spanish-speaking) Latin America (Schneider 
2009). This article extends the Comparative 
Capitalism (CC) perspective to Brazil. On the 
one side, the focus is on the classical questions 
of CC, i.e. the determinants of economic 
development and the differences to other types 
of capitalism, on the other side the relationship 
between these varieties and social inequality. 
In particular the question of social inequality – 
in the sense of the relationship between capital 
and labour – was of crucial importance for the 
original development of those models of 
capitalism. The main intention of their 
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inventors was to demonstrate that economies 
with strong unions and a relatively low degree 
of social inequality are competitive, in spite of 
the widespread belief into the superiority of 
the (neo-liberal) US model of capitalism 
during the 1980s. Social inequality here is 
understood as a product of economic 
structures, complementing a debate on social 
questions that is focused on transfers and the 
shape of the welfare state2. As will be 
demonstrated below, Brazil has been able to 
realize a high degree of economic growth in 
spite of a high degree of social inequality – 
although growth most likely would have been 
much higher with a lower degree of social 
inequality. At the same time, my contribution 
argues that this economic success does not 
necessarily lead to comprehensive social 
participation and may also not prove to be 
sustainable, in the absence of a much higher 
degree of economic redistribution. 
1. Comparative Capitalism: State of the 
art and perspectives 
Over the last years, the Comparative 
Capitalism-perspective has become somewhat 
canonical in the study of the political economy 
of Northern industrialized countries (Blyth 
2003: 215). The research programme that has 
been founded by authors such as Shonfield 
(1965) and popularized by Michel Albert 
(1991) has led to numerous typologies of 
national models of capitalism, with theoretical 
roots in the regulation school (Amable 2003; 
Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997), Neo-Marxism 
(Coates 2000) and New Institutionalism (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a). In particular the last 
version has led to many empirical studies, 
based on its juxtaposition of liberal market 
economies (LME) – illustrated with the case of 
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the US – and coordinated market economies 
(CME) – illustrated with the case of Germany. 
The basic assumption of this theoretical 
programme is that specific institutional 
complementarities inherent to each variety are 
able to explain the divergent patterns of 
innovation of the leading sectors within liberal 
and coordinated market economies. Hall and 
Soskice (2001b: 17-33) distinguish – similar to 
other approaches within Comparative 
Capitalism (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 11-20) – 
five interdependent institutions: (1) corporate 
finance, (2) corporate governance, (3) 
industrial relations, (4) education/training and 
(5) the transfer of innovation within the 
economy. Based on this distinction, the 
Comparative Capitalism was able to deliver a 
parsimonious, but still fairly sophisticated 
analysis of Northern capitalisms. 
Still, over the last years, more and more 
limitations of this research tradition have 
become apparent (Hancké et al.  2007: 4-9, 
Jackson and Deeg 2006: 37-39). These 
limitations include the narrow focus on the 
countries of the triad, the overly strong 
dualism between LME and CME within the 
dominant Varieties of Capitalism approach, 
the omission of transnational influences and 
the neglect of the role of the state. A second 
generation of Comparative Capitalism studies 
tries to overcome these limitations. In line with 
Drahokoupil (2009), Nölke and Vliegenthart 
(2009), Schneider (2009), ten Brink (2010), 
and Taylor and Nölke (2010) this contribution 
will enlarge the spatial confines of 
Comparative Capitalism, ask for the existence 
of additional basic types beyond LME and 
CME, analyze the role of transnational 
influences (in particular of multinational 
enterprises) and highlight the role of the state 
for the establishment of particular types of 
capitalism outside of the triad. 
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The focus of this contribution is on the mode 
of capitalism within the industrialized sectors 
of “emerging markets”, in particular the 
Brazilian case. Particularly in the context of 
the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) this question has gained considerable 
importance, also for the development of the 
world economy as a whole. The core question 
is whether these economies develop into a 
similar direction as those of the triad, or 
diverge in more or less permanent ways. In the 
following, we will try to give a preliminary 
answer to this question, by developing a rough 
sketch of a “BRIC” model of capitalism and 
illustrating this model with the case of Brazil. 
The focus is – similar to Schneider and 
Soskice (2009) – on an outline of the current 
status of these economies, while the historical 
evolution within colonialism, class conflicts 
and neo-liberal reforms will be neglected 
(Schrank 2009). Although it is yet too early to 
judge on the long-term stability of this model, 
we can identify some highly specific elements, 
in spite of some parallels to institutions in 
liberal and coordinated economies. 
2. State-permeated market economies as a 
BRIC-variety of capitalism 
The LME/CME juxtaposition as developed by 
Hall and Soskice (2001b) allows for a rough 
typology of most Northern industrialized 
economies, although with some limitations in 
case of the Mediterranean countries, where the 
state plays a more important role than allowed 
for by Hall and Soskice (Schmidt 2003). New 
basic varieties should not be introduced 
without necessity, given that the parsimony of 
the Hall/Soskice model was a crucial factor for 
its success (Hancké et al. 2007: 16; Jackson 
and Deeg 2006: 31-32). Still, there are 
limitations to this dualism, at least with regard 
to the economies at the periphery of Western 
Europe and the US, with their strong 
dependencies on multinationals based in their 
neighbouring centres. For these economies, we 
have coined the model of “dependent market 
economies/DME” (Nölke and Vliegenthart 
2009), given their dependence on decisions 
taken within the hierarchies of western 
multinational enterprises (see table 1).  
Foreign direct investments are also important 
for „emerging economies“, such as Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, but they are much 
less dependent on these investments, if 
compared with countries such as Hungary or 
the Czech Republic. The BRIC variety of 
capitalism is rather dominated by dense 
relationships between public authorities and 
major domestic enterprises as central 
coordination mechanism. In marked contrast to 
DMEs, these political economies are rather 
dominated by national capitalists, not those of 
the centre. The focus is on the role of the state, 
as already described by Peter Evens (1979) – a 
state that is cooperating closely with national 
elites and does not have to give in to the 
demands of multinational enterprises, but is 
able to impose certain conditions onto the 
latter. In a more abstract way, we are 
witnessing a fourth mode of social 
coordination, besides markets (LME), 
networks (CME), hierarchies (DME) now 
clans, as developed by Ouchi (1980) based on 
transaction cost economics. These clans are 
central within the BRIC-model of „state-
permeated market economies“ (SME). Clans 
are, similar to markets, hierarchies and 
network a basic mode of social coordination, 
with a particular focus on a background of 
common values (Ouchi 1980: 130f.). SMEs 
are dominated by a particularly close co-
operation between public and business actors 
that is at least indirectly based on personal 
relations – partially even family ties – 
supported by common values and a shared 
social background. A close co-operation 
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between public authorities and companies can 
also be found within other modes of 
capitalism, but in no case this is equally 
predominant, and strongly based on personal 
relations and common values. State 
permeation does not necessarily entail the 
existence of a “strong”, centralized state, a 
dominance of public enterprises and
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Table 1: Three basic varieties of capitalism 
Variety 
Institution 
Liberal Market 
Economies/LME 
Coordinated Market 
Economies/CME 
Dependent Market 
Economies/DME 
Distinctive 
coordination 
mechanism 
Competitive markets 
and formal contracts 
Inter-firm networks and 
associations 
Dependence on MNC 
intra-firm hierarchies  
Financial system 
Domestic and 
international capital 
markets 
Domestic bank lending 
and internally generated 
funds 
Foreign direct 
investments and foreign-
owned banks 
Corporate 
governance 
Outsider control: 
dispersed shareholders 
Insider control: 
concentrated shareholders 
Control by headquarters 
of multinational 
enterprises 
Industrial 
relations 
Pluralist, market-based, 
hardly any collective 
agreements 
Corporatist, rather 
consensual, sector-wide or 
even national agreements 
Appeasement of skilled 
labor, company level 
collective agreements 
Skill formation 
General skills, high 
research and 
development 
expenditures 
Company- or industry-
specific skills, vocational 
training 
Limited expenditures for 
further qualification  
Transfer of 
innovations 
 
Based on markets and 
formal contracts 
Important role of joint 
ventures and business 
associations  
Intra-firm transfer within 
transnational enterprise 
Comparative 
advantages 
Radical innovation in 
technology and service 
sectors 
Incremental innovation of 
capital goods 
Assembly platforms for 
semi-standardized 
industrial goods 
Source: Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009 
 
 centralized economic planning, but rather an 
omnipresence of public authorities that may 
also follow their particular concerns. At the 
same time, these authorities – and their 
cooperating companies that are tempted to 
pursue rent-seeking activities – are largely 
kept in balance by a relatively autonomous 
role of private capital, thereby preventing the 
comprehensive capture of public policies by 
private interests as witnessed in patrimonial 
regimes (although this capture clearly is not 
completely absent in SMEs). 
Foreign direct investments (and selective acts 
of privatization) are welcome as modernizing 
factors within this neo-mercantilist model, as 
long as they do not undermine the general 
preponderance of national capital. Moreover, it 
is not coincidental that the SME model 
emerged within the big economies outside of 
the triad – and that this model differs 
somewhat from the strongly export-oriented 
model of the East Asian tiger states. The rise 
of the SME model was based on several inter-
related developments. On the one side, it 
coincided with the re-orientation of (North-
South) foreign investments during the 1980s 
and early 1990s that shifted from a focus on 
access to raw materials and cheap labour 
towards access to the internal markets of the 
(semi-) periphery – the latter requires a fairly 
close cooperation with national capital and 
contributes to the modernization of the latter 
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(Abu-El-Haj 2007:96). At the same time, 
national capital depends for its expansion on 
foreign direct investments – even entailing 
wholesale privatization - for the modernization 
of those economic sectors that are providing 
basic economic services (e.g. 
telecommunication and other public utilities). 
The notion of “clans” as mechanism for social 
coordination, the symbiosis of national capital 
and public authorities and the selective 
modernization via foreign direct investments 
enables us to describe the central elements of 
the SME-variety, addressing the five typical 
elements of Comparative Capitalism. The 
focus is on the interrelationships between 
corporate governance and the other four 
institutional domains, in line with the usual 
approach towards western capitalism (e.g. Hall 
and Gingrich 2004, Höpner 2005). (1) In 
contrast to minority shareholders (LME), 
institutional block-holders (CME) or control 
by multinational corporations (DME), major 
SME companies usually are either dominated 
by families or by the state, in any case by 
organized national capital. These ownership 
structures lead to obvious complementarities 
with corporate finance (2), as far as they make 
SME companies fairly independent from 
short-term fluctuations on global capital 
markets as well as from profit expectations of 
international investors. Moreover, control by 
national capital or even public ownership 
frequently allows SME companies to tap into 
public support (e.g. subsidized credit by state 
banks). A close cooperation between major 
companies and public authorities is also 
helpful with regard to industrial relations (3), 
given that public regulations (and their 
selective implementation) may serve as a core 
contribution to keeping labour costs low, an 
important ingredient to the competition 
strategy of companies from these countries. 
The same is true for education and training (4) 
that is geared towards those sectors where 
national companies are most active. In 
addition, the class background is an important 
factor for the transformation of educational 
capital into labour market success, thereby 
contributing to the reproduction of class 
structures. Finally, public interventions also 
assist with the transfer of innovations and 
competition policy (5). Soft protection of 
intellectual property rights allow for reverse 
engineering that is an important ingredient for 
technological catch-up. At the same time, 
competition policies are geared towards the 
temporary protection of individual companies, 
e.g. to enable expansion into other markets 
based on monopoly profits. All in all, these 
complementarities enable companies from 
emerging markets to be competitive in 
particular on a medium level of technology 
and in the procession of raw goods, based on 
rather low costs. 
It is impossible to empirically test this model 
within the limited space provided, but we can 
hint at individual aspects within the modern 
economic sectors of China (ten Brink 2010), 
India (Taylor and Nölke 2010) und Russia 
(Drahokoupil 2009; Myant and Drahokoupil 
2010: 22f.), although the latter shows obvious 
traits of a rentier economy and family ties are 
obviously more important in the “old” 
economies of Brazil and China, if compared to 
the transformation economies of China and 
Russia. While we can thus point to the 
existence of a couple of Comparative 
Capitalism studies on Russia, India and China, 
Brazil so far has received much less attention. 
3. The case of Brazil 
Departing from the model of state-permeated 
capitalism as described above, the following 
section will provide a very rough and 
simplified sketch of the Brazilian political 
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economy. The focus is on the modern sectors 
of the economy, in particular on multinational 
enterprises expanding from Brazil, the 
Brazilian “multilatinas”.  The purpose is to 
empirically illustrate the theoretical model. In 
contrast, the historical evolution of Brazilian 
capitalism, based on colonial inheritance, early 
independence and world market integration, or 
the role of various presidencies will be 
neglected, as well be more specific details. 
Comparative advantages 
Compared to many neighbour countries, the 
Brazilian economy is fairly diversified, also a 
consequence of the decades-old strategy of 
import-substitution. At the same time, it is 
lacking major clusters of companies that are 
global leaders in a particular sector. Still, we 
can highlight certain comparative advantages, 
based on the sector distribution of Brazilian 
multinationals (Flynn 2007: 17; see also Abu-
El-Haj 2007; Arbix 2010; Dahlman/Frischtak 
1993). One obvious focus is on the procession 
of raw goods, e.g. by companies such as 
Votorantim (cellulose, paper, cement), Vale 
(iron ore), Petrobras (oil), Gerdau, Usiminas 
und CVD (steel). Globally renowned is also 
the Brazilian agricultural industry, supported 
by rising prices and by the increasing 
production of organic fuels. The comparative 
advantages of Brazilian companies are based 
on natural resources, combined with low 
labour costs – less on high labour productivity 
or product quality/innovation. However, in 
contrast to many other economies in Latin 
America, Brazilian exports are not dominated 
by the export of raw goods, but rather by 
processed products (Phillips 2004: 74). 
Moreover, in selective cases we can identify 
companies that are globally competitive, such 
as Embraer (civil aircraft) and Petrobras (deep 
sea oil mining), thus “pockets of efficiency” 
(Phillips 2004: 55) that are already familiar 
from post-war Brazil.  
A second major feature of the Brazilian 
economy that stands out, in particular in 
comparison to other Latin American countries, 
is the rising importance of the large and very 
dynamically growing domestic market (Abu-
El-Haj 2007: 107f.). Production for this 
domestic market has given rise to a number of 
multinational enterprises such as AmBev 
(beverages, now part of InBev), textile 
producers (e.g. Camargo Correia), 
construction companies and the corresponding 
engineering bureaus (Norberto Odebrecht, 
Andrade Gutierrez) and air transport (VARIG 
and TAM). Among the large, but less 
internationally oriented companies, we may 
also count a number of banks, such as 
Bradesco, Banco do Brasil, Banco Itaú and 
Unibanco. 
Corporate Governance 
Next to the Brazilian companies portrayed 
above, we can find a substantial role of foreign 
multinationals. Still, these companies are 
much less relevant than in the dependent 
market economies described above. Moreover, 
they are exposed to fairly strong competition 
and thus cannot play out their powerful 
position to the same extent as in other Latin 
American economies, inter alia indicated by a 
fairly low financial transfer to their company 
headquarters (Abu-el-Haj 2007: 108). In any 
case, national capital plays the dominating role 
within the Brazilian economy. Most major 
Brazilian companies are exchange-listed, but 
usually are dominated by family shareholdings 
or other block-holders. In addition, the 
Brazilian state keeps substantial shareholdings, 
particularly in case of former public 
enterprises that have been privatized (e.g. 
Embraer). Direct state intervention, however, 
is rather rare, more important are indirect 
channels, in particular via institutions such as 
the national development bank BNDES 
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(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social). 
 
In nearly all cases, major Brazilian companies 
are fairly independent from short-term 
fluctuations on the financial markets. There is 
no open market for the control of companies – 
as characteristic for LMEs – but rather an 
“insider”-dominated mode of corporate 
control, more in line with traditional CME-
structures. Completely dispersed shareholding 
is very rare, minority shareholders tend to be 
disadvantaged by dominating shareholders. 
Correspondingly, the recent “Corporate 
Governance”-movement met considerable 
resistance in Brazil (Grün 2010), even if the 
dominant role of family capitalism has been 
modernized:  
Family-controlled companies, the typical 
business arrangement of the Brazilian 
bourgeoisie, fell from 23 to 17 units of the 100 
largest between 1990 and 1997. Meanwhile, a 
new mode of local bourgeoisie organization, 
dominant minority property (companies whose 
controllers hold between 20 and 50 percent of 
the voting shares, with the remainder being 
offered to the public) increased from 5 to 23 of 
the largest 100 companies. This shift reflected 
the legal changes made to attract international 
investors” (Abu-El-Haj 2007: 106). 
Corporate Finance 
During the last decade, capital markets have 
gained increasing relevance for the financing 
of Brazilian companies. However, the latter 
still are protected by families and other stock-
holders, thereby moderating the pressure 
emanating from internationalized finance. 
Typical – though less dominant as in other 
economies of Latin America – are also large 
conglomerates that have drawn on their 
diversification in order to survive the massive 
crises and adjustment programs of the 1990s. 
The focus is on internally generated funds as 
well as bank loans, in part subsidized by 
institutions such as BNDES. Direct and 
indirect state support can take on many shapes, 
including tax rebates, state guarantees and 
subsidized credit provided by state banks, all 
contributing to financing conditions that are 
more favourable than usual. Besides BNDES, 
semi-public pension funds and straight state 
subsidies have to be mentioned. The latter e.g. 
financed a substantial sjhare of Embraer 
development costs, thus leading to a trade 
dispute with Canada, due to the competition 
with Bombardier (Flynn 2007: 19; Goldstein 
2002: 111). Global capital markets are tapped 
selectively in order to modernize the domestic 
economy. In contrast to dependent market 
economies, however, we do not witness a 
“sell-out” of domestic banks: „In 2000, 
domestic banks combining public and private 
institutions, still controlled 72,6% of the total 
financial endowment“ (Abu-El-Haj 2007: 
104). This distribution of ownership was very 
advantageous during the most recent financial 
crisis – the retreat of international banks (and 
the more careful operations by national private 
banks) was compensated by a massive 
expansion of public banking (Grün 2010: 14). 
Compared to companies from liberal 
economies, Brazilian enterprises are fairly well 
protected against short-term turbulences. 
Generally, Brazilian companies weathered the 
global financial crisis remarkably well 
(Ocampo 2009: 19). Domestic banks did not 
have to undertake highly risky speculation, 
because they had good returns based on high 
domestic interest rates – although the “Custo 
Brasil” also happens to be a major cost 
disadvantage for Brazilian companies and 
consumers (Dowbor 2009: 125). Moreover, 
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the close interpenetration of political and 
administrative elites with Brazilian business 
also leads to a relatively small degree of 
capital flight, another welcome puffer during 
the financial crisis. Finally, the crisis was 
mitigated by short-term public measures, in 
particular by additional development bank 
credits and domestic demand stimulation. 
Industrial Relations 
The importance of cost advantages is also 
important with regard to Brazilian industrial 
relations. Although there is fairly sophisticated 
labour law, this only pertains to a relatively 
small (but important) share of the Brazilian 
workforce, compared to the much larger share 
of workers in the informal sector that is not 
protected at all – not an unusual situation in 
the Latin American context. Generally, labour 
markets are fragmented between a small, well-
paid, organized and protected segment of core 
workers in the public sector as well as in major 
companies on the one side, and the (semi-) 
informal economy on the other side, without 
any substantial union protection. Again, state 
permeation is important, as far as the “labour 
aristocracy” is being protected by law and – in 
spite of the neo-liberal tendencies of the last 
decades – well integrated into the collusion 
between national capital and the state (Phillips 
2004: 161-164). 
Small and medium scale enterprises that 
operate in fairly close relationship to the 
informal sector, however, are much more 
critical towards stringent labour protection. 
The same is true for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR): Whereas small 
enterprises are highly sceptical towards these 
initiatives, the large multilatinas are somewhat 
more open towards the campaigns of 
institutions such as the Abrinq Foundation or 
the Instituto Ethos. This openness is also 
motivated by cross-border campaigns within 
this field, by multilateral institutions or 
transnational NGOs. In particular Brazilian 
companies with direct exposure to markets in 
industrialized countries are open to CSR 
initiatives (Arraya 2006:33). However, even 
those companies would be hardly keen to 
introduce powerful unions and better working 
conditions on a comprehensive basis, since 
affordable services by the informal sector 
contribute considerably to the cost advantages 
of the Brazilian economy. And even in those 
parts of the economy where labour unions are 
important, they operate less based on 
collective action and negotiations with 
employer associations, but rather by direct 
political ties with the state – a highly 
significant contrast to the role of unions in 
coordinated market economies. 
Education and training 
Traditionally, Brazilian companies did not 
invest much into education and training of 
their workforce, but rather relied on activities 
of their own government (Arbix 2010: 19; 
Dahlmann and Frischtak 1993: 415). Thus, 
they did not only follow the priorities of the 
given government, but also suffered quite 
considerably during the heavy macro-
economic crises of the 1990s. Moreover, 
public investments in these activities generally 
are low, if compared to those of Northern 
countries. Public support into science and 
technology exists in particular since the 1970s, 
but rather in basic instead of applied sciences. 
Cooperation between universities and 
companies was limited, but has intensified 
more recently (Arbix 2010: 18-20; Dahlmann 
and Frischtak 1993: 415). State-owned 
Petrobras again is an exception, due to its 
rather close cooperation with universities and 
the by far largest expenditures for research and 
development (Carvalho and Goldstein 2008: 
13). 
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Some other companies (e.g. Embraer) have 
started their own training programmes, 
limited, however, to a small group of 
employees (Goldstein 2002: 108). Most 
employees have only very few incentives for 
investments into their own education, due to 
their short-term and insecure employment 
relations (World Bank 2006). Similar to the 
field of industrial relations we find a 
fragmentation between small groups of highly 
qualified labour (education on foreign or 
private universities) and a much larger group 
of hardly qualified labour with a focus on 
general skills – a much larger and less 
qualified group than in CME, LME and 
DMEs. Only very slowly we are witnessing a 
process of increased secondary education, but 
again this is dominated by students stemming 
from middle and upper classes with better 
social relations, supported by a system of 
private schools and spatial segmentation. 
Transfer of innovations 
Due to the traditionally very limited role of 
internal research and development, 
innovations are usually imported from abroad, 
usually via Northern multinational enterprises. 
Even a leading high tech company such as 
Embraer has to get along without 
comprehensive internal research and 
development. Instead it has to mobilize 
innovations via its network of international 
partners. Given these circumstances, its 
success is highly impressive, the more so as it 
does not receive massive military subsidies, in 
contrast to most other aircraft producers 
(Goldstein2002; Salles-Filho, Marcio da 
Silveira and Bonacelli 2009). Public 
institutions are involved into the transfer of 
innovations to a limited degree. Officially, this 
is a matter of high significance, as symbolized 
by the establishment of numerous (semi-) 
public institutions as well as fiscal incentives. 
Still, the success of this measures is somewhat 
muted, Brazilian companies only profit to a 
rather limited degree from public technology 
transfer (Arbix 2010), with exceptions, e.g.,  in 
case of Petrobras or the evolution of a research 
and development network in the Paraíba valley 
(Goldstein 2002: 108). 
Finally, the conduct of competition policy also 
gives an indication for the close collaboration 
between public authorities and major public 
enterprises. Competition policy in the strict 
American/European sense hardly exists at all 
(if so, only on paper). Over many years, a 
number of sectors were protected from 
(international) competition, thereby leading to 
the developments of monopolies or 
oligopolies. This is to the short-term 
disadvantage of consumers, but to the 
advantage of a few major Brazilian companies 
that were enabled to mobilize the resources 
needed for successful cross-border expansion. 
Competition policy, however, lately was also 
targeted in order to create competitive 
domestic companies. This can entail the 
selective attribution of market access to 
foreign companies, in order to give domestic 
companies strong incentives to get rid of the 
dangerous rent-seeking perspective that going 
hand-in-hand with import substitution and the 
corresponding focus on state protection (Abu-
El-Haj 2007: 97). At the same time, 
competition policy is used in order to give way 
to the efficient provision of those services that 
are necessary for the expansion of domestic 
capital, e.g. in telecommunications, power 
supply and, more lately, in certain  sectors of 
banking (Dowbor 2009: 125). Generally, this 
has given rise to the consolidation of two 
patterns – sectors with oligopolies dominated 
by national capital on the one hand and rather 
fragmented, competitive sectors with strong 
international participation on the other (Abu-
El-Haj 2007: 100). 
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Central coordination mechanism 
To conclude, it becomes obvious how strongly 
Brazilian companies are profitting form their 
close collaboration with the state, to a much 
higher extent than most triad companies. This 
close collaboration led some observers to call 
Latin American multinationals public-private 
hybrids (Clifton 2007: 7). Particularly in the 
field of natural resources, close cooperation 
with public authorities is essential for 
company success. At the same time, Brazil has 
witnessed a policy of purposeful 
diversification of economic structures, on the 
basis of state-led import substitution and 
targeted protection of individual economic 
sectors. More recently, economic elites plead 
more fervently for more comprehensive 
liberalization. Although the old protection is 
inefficient and may lead to wasteful rent-
seeking, a literal implementation of the 
Washington consensus, however, is perceived 
to be an unacceptable sell-out and 
subordination under (Anglo-American) capital 
markets (Abu-El-Haj 2007). Compared, e.g., 
to the US, the internationalization of Brazilian 
capitalism is relatively limited (Phillips 2004: 
194), although partially integrated into global 
capitalist networks (Flynn 2007). 
The Brazil-typical „thick ties between the 
traditional oligarchy and the state“ (Phillips 
2004: 55) are not only a recipe for success, but 
also a liability for economic development, as 
indicated by many episodes of corruption. 
Still, we may distinguish Brazil from many 
much more problematic regimes in other 
countries of Latin America: „The government 
adopted relatively autonomous policies that 
advanced the interests of the entire bourgeoisie 
without degenerating into clientelistic support 
for particular firms“(Abu-el-Haq 2007: 110). 
Correspondingly, the model of a “clan” 
appears to be the best approximation of the 
central mode of social coordination in Brazil: 
Based on a rather similar (class) background, 
the political economy is dominated by 
informal, personalized relations, thereby 
easing the creation of trust and social 
coordination. In contrast to coordinated market 
economies, non-market coordination is not 
provided by formal institutions – business 
associations, e.g., are rather weak, a marked 
contrast to the powerful role of Brazilian 
capital (Phillips 2004: 195). At the same time, 
we do not find a powerful, centralized state as 
in East Asia – in contrast, the state is strongly 
fragmented internally (ibd.: 237-239). Still, we 
witness a high degree of social coordination, 
supported by the social capital that is 
accumulated in clan-like relations between 
private and public elites. All in all, we find a 
type of capitalism that has worked fairly well 
during the last years, at least if compared with 
neighbour countries. Moreover, its short-term 
perspectives are positive, due to high prices for 
natural resources and a rather large internal 
market. Long-term perspectives, however, are 
less positive, due to limited innovation 
capacity as well as extreme inequality and the 
corresponding limits on the further extension 
of domestic demand. 
4. Brazilian capitalism and social 
inequality 
This contribution did not treat questions of 
social inequality with the usual focus on social 
programs (e.g. “Bolsa Familia”), but rather 
from the perspective of the socio-economic 
system. The deeply unequal character of the 
Brazilian society has become more than 
obvious, given a type of capitalism that relies 
on clans as a mode of social coordination, on 
shared values between economic and political 
elites, on low inter-class mobility, on the rule 
of families and on close collaboration between 
the latter and public authorities. Generally, 
Brazilian capitalism reproduces the basic class 
structure. Elections rather lead to changes 
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within the elite, not to its decline. Elites are 
supported by multi-party clientelism (Phillips 
2004: 236) and social mobility is limited to a 
small part of the population. Labour is 
fragmented between a small group of 
privileged workers and the majority within the 
informal sector, the latter with a very low 
grade of organization and, therefore, very 
limited means to enforce social redistribution. 
During the last years however, the success of 
the Brazilian variety of capitalism has led to 
some positive effect, as far as we are 
witnessing some trickle-down effects that have 
allowed larger parts of the population to 
participate at the effects of the natural 
resources boom and the growth of the 
domestic market, e.g. via infrastructure 
investments, the financing of small social 
programs and the increase of real wages and 
the related pensions (Dowbor 2009: 128). 
Correspondingly, average incomes have risen 
during the last years and have increased the 
demand for local products and services, 
thereby also improving employment 
perspectives for a large share of the 
population. These positive developments, 
however, shall not distract from the fact that 
they are unable to overcome the deep-rooted 
inequality within the Brazilian society. They 
mainly benefit the growing middle classes and 
do not necessarily reach the marginalized parts 
of the population, also taking into account that 
the wage share of gross national program is 
still a meagre 40%  (Dowbor 2009: 118). 
Generally, we are observing an economically 
successful reproduction of existing socio-
economic structures, not a social 
transformation. Brazil has mastered the recent 
crisis better than many other states, in and 
outside of Latin America. It also has improved 
the lot of its middle classes. Still, it could do 
better by further stimulating domestic demand 
by a more equal and just distribution of 
income. 
In a more general perspective, this 
contribution has demonstrated how to use the 
Comparative Capitalism analytical framework 
in an at least indirect way for the analysis of 
social inequalities. The case of Brazil may not 
be unique, similar results may be expected for 
the other BRICs, with some qualifications for 
the role of old elite families in case of China 
and Russia. At the same time, the study has 
also demonstrated a number of shortcomings 
of the old “Varieties”-approach, including its 
narrow focus on the formal economy, its 
neglect of the role of the state as well as of 
macro-economic issues, most notably of the 
importance of large domestic markets in the 
BRIC and – particularly obvious in the context 
of the financial crisis – of macro-economic 
policies (Abu-El-Haj 2007). In sum, the 
Comparative Capitalism framework is useful 
for the analysis of the rise of the BRIC 
economies, but has to be complemented by a 
more “political” approach that takes better 
notice of the role of the state as well as of the 
elites that are backing certain socio-economic 
models. 
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